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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
is found in §78-2-2(3)(d)(ii) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Where improvements are not included in determining an
assessment, can the County go back the following year and correct
the assessment and collect additional taxes notwithstanding the
fact that the taxes levied for the prior year were paid in full
when they were due and the property has since changed hands?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1984, the property in question was assessed by the
Salt Lake County taxing authority ("County").

The record owner

of the property fully paid the 1984 assessment when it was due.
In 1985 the property in question was sold to Respondent Sunkist
Service Company ("Sunkist").

Later in 1985 the County discovered

that a building erected on the property had not been included in
the 1984 assessment.

The County then sought to reassess the pro-

perty and include the value of the improvements.
A hearing was held on June 24, 1986, before the Utah
State Tax Commission and in its decision of July 23, 1986, it concluded the subject property had been "undervalued" as a result of
the Countyfs error and held that it did not "escape" assessment.
A formal hearing was requested by petitioner in the
matter.

The Utah State Tax Commission issued a formal decision

dated July 2, 1987, affirming the decision of July 23, 1986.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In 1984, the property in question was assessed by the
respondent.

However, certain improvements located thereon were

not considered in arriving at a valuation of the property.

The

taxes which were determined to be due and owing based on the
County's assessment were paid on or before their due date in 1984.
Prior to the reassessment of the property, the property
changed hands and the purchaser (Respondent herein) assumed that
the taxes assessed and paid by its predecessor in interest represented the entire tax obligation affecting the property for the
year 1984.
In 1985 the County realized that the improvements had
been omitted in determining the 1984 valuation and it attempted
to collect $46,296.69 in lost revenue from the new owner through
an appendix roll.

The amount of the assessment is not in dispute

here, but the Respondent strongly disputes its obligation to pay
said amount.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Respondent contends that not including improvements in
determining an assessment results in an "underassessment" of the
property.

This is particularly so where taxes levied for the

prior year on the property were paid in full when they were due
and the property has since changed hands with the purchaser
reasonably assuming its predecessor in interest paid the entire
tax obligation for the tax year 1984.
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Petitioner contends that because it omitted the improvements from its assessment, the property has escaped assessment
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann, §59-5-17 (1953, as amended).
ARGUMENT
Point I
IMPROVEMENTS NOT CONSIDERED IN AN ASSESSMENT
RESULT IN AN "UNDERASSESSMENT" OF THE PROPERTY
The failure of the Petitioner to include the improvements in its 1984 valuation of the property constitutes an
"underassessment" and the available authority is clear that the
County cannot go back and collect amounts claimed to be owing due
to such an underassessment once the taxes have been paid and the
property has changed hands.
In Utah, undervalued property has been held to be not
subject to reassessment in a subsequent year even though the Code
(§59-5-17) permits the subsequent assessment of properties that
"escaped assessment" in a prior year.

Builders Components Supply

Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d 97 (Utah 1969).

The Court interpreted

§59-5-17 of the Code as allowing for assessment of property
omitted, but not property that was merely undervalued in a prior
year.

The Court also stressed that tax statutes should be

construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority.
Other jurisdictions with similar tax statutes have considered this same matter.

These cases held that failure to
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include improvements results in an undervaluation not correctable
through a subsequent assessment.
In 1932, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in State v.
Mortgage-Bond Co.

of New York, 140 So. 365 (Ala. 1932), deter-

mined that improvements which were not included in an assessment
were not subsequently assessable as an "escape" under the Alabama
statutes.

In the Mortgage-Bond situation, as in the instant

case, the State failed to assess taxes on improvements although
the underlying land was assessed.

The Alabama tax statutes are

almost identical to the Utah statutes.

The statutes require that

the land and improvements thereon be listed separately on the tax
rolls just as required by §59-5-1 of the Utah Code.

The Alabama

statutes provide for reassessment of "escaped" property as does
§59-5-17 of the Utah Code.

In deciding whether unassessed impro-

vements were "undervalued" or "escaped" property within the
meaning of the statute, the Court pointed out that lands and
improvements are not subject to separate tax liens.
true under Utah law (Utah Code Ann.

This is also

§59-10-3 (1953)).

The Court

reasoned that the listing of lands and improvements separately
was really an aid in fixing the tax valuation of the real estate
as a whole.

Therefore, where improvements were not assessed,

this had to be regarded as an undervaluation of the real property
rather than an escape, and therefore not assessable in subsequent
years.

A

A more recent Oklahoma case also indicates that a nonassessment of improvements constitutes an undervaluation rather
than an omission.

In Leyh v. Glass, 501 P.2d 259 (Okl. 1973),

the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that improvements do not constitute omitted property within a statute permitting assessment of
property omitted from tax rolls in prior years.

Here again,

the Oklahoma statutes are identical to the Utah statutes.

In

Oklahoma real estate is defined as lands and improvements
thereon, just as in the Utah Code definitions (§59-3-1(2)).

The

County Assessor in Oklahoma is required to assess and list land
and improvements separately, as in Utah.

Oklahoma also has a

statute providing for the assessment of omitted properties.

The

Court concluded that, even though land and improvements are to be
valued separately, this does not clearly indicate that the
legislature intended to make structures on real estate a separate
class of property for the purpose of taxation.
Another major factor in the Court's decision that a nonassessment of improvements constitutes an undervaluation rather
than an omission was the hardship that permitting this to occur
would place upon innocent subsequent purchasers of the property
who would be stuck with having to pay the tax.

The fact that the

Oklahoma legislature failed to provide any protection for subsequent purchasers lead the Court to conclude that the legislature did not intend to establish improvements as a separate class
of real property which could constitute omitted property within
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the meaning of the escape statute.

Therefore, the Court held

that, when the value of improvements is not included in the value
of real property as shown on the tax rolls, such improvements do
not constitute omitted property but rather an undervaluation
which is not subject to reevaluation or reassessment.
Two other cases which have reached the same conclusion
are Westward Look Development Corporation, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue of State of Arizona, 673 P.2d 26 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1983)
and Whited v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 152 So. 552 (La. 1934) .
Both cases hold that unassessed improvements are undervaluations
for purposes of reassessment.

In Whited, Louisiana law required

the value of lands and improvements be recorded separately.

As

in the Mortgage-Bond case referred to above, the Court regarded
the objective of this statutory requirement that land and improvements be listed separately as one of providing information and
not as intended to create a new category of property.

In denying

the government's right to reassess non-assessed improvements, the
Louisiana Court relied on the statutory definition of real
estate, which is similar to Utah's, including both lands and the
structures located thereon.
The Court in Westward Look, based part of its decision
on the lack of warning of the adverse consequences to bona fide
purchasers of real property if a rule construing non-assessments
of improvements as omissions were adopted.

The instant case

involves just such a situation, where an unsuspecting purchaser
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has had its property subjected to a lien and is being asked to
pay tax relating to an assessment which occurred in a period
prior to the date that the purchaser acquired an interest in the
subject property.
A key factor in the cases cited above was whether
improvements on land are a separate class of property which
"escaped" if not included in the valuation of the property on
which the improvements are located.

In Utah, as in the states in

which those cases were decided, the statutory definition of real
estate (§59-3-1(2)(c)) includes the improvements located thereon.
Improvements and land are not subject to separate tax liens
(§59-10-3).

Listing the valuation of land and improvements

separately pursuant to §59-5-1 is merely intended to assist the
taxing entity and the taxpayer in evaluating the separate components that are part of a total valuation of the "property".
Under the law of this State, for tax purposes, improvements are considered part of the real property.

They will

obviously influence its value as the natural features of the land
might do.

However, where an assessment of the real property has

been made and the taxes paid, it would be as inappropriate to go
back and attempt to levy additional taxes on the basis of omitted
improvements as it would be on the basis of some overlooked
natural feature of the property.

Even if all proper value com-

ponents were not considered in arriving at an assessment, that
would clearly not be a basis for further assessment as "escaped"
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property under §59-5-17. Therefore, a failure to consider
improvements might contribute to an underassessment but obviously
not to an "escape".
Petitioner cites Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan
County, 64 Utah 335, 230 P. 1020 (1924), as its foundation for
claiming Respondent is liable for an additional tax assessment.
Petitioner's reliance on that case is entirely misplaced.

Union

Portland is easily distinguishable from the present case on its
facts and is therefore not applicable to the case at hand.

In

Union Portland, the plaintiff owned real property that was
assessed by the State Board of Equalization at the beginning of
the 1921 tax year.

Later in that same year, before the property

taxes were paid, the Board discovered improvements on the property which had not been accounted for in its prior assessment.
The Board, within the same tax year, then reassessed the property.

The Court held that the Board's subsequent assessment was

valid.

In fashioning its decision, the Court relied on the

applicable statute in force at the time which gave the Board the
power to correct assessment errors before taxes on the property
were paid.

Specifically, the Court held that there is "no

question concerning the precise power and duty to assess property
that has been omitted any time before taxes have been paid".

Id.

at 1023 (emphasis added).
There are two key facts in Union Portland that are a
stark contrast to those in the instant case.
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In the case before

this Court, the property changed hands before the attempted
reassessment took place.

In addition, Respondent, relying on the

assessment and full payment of taxes against the real property
and improvements as recorded on the tax rolls, purchased the property believing all taxes had been paid.

Prior to the purchase,

the former owner had paid the assessment for the year in question
in full.

In Union Portland a key element in allowing the

reassessment was that it took place in the same tax year as the
original assessment and before the taxes based on the original
assessment had been paid.
It is clear that the applicable case law, including
Utah's, forbids the reassessment of taxes on property to include
improvement values not considered where such reassessment occurs
in a subsequent tax year and after the assessed taxes have been
paid in full.

The present case clearly fits within the standards

outlined in the cases referred to above.

Accordingly, Respondent

should not be liable for newly assessed taxes relating to prior
tax year assessments.
Point II
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF CASE LAW PROHIBITS
REASSESSMENT OF OMITTED IMPROVEMENTS
The great weight of authority in this Country does not
allow retroactive reassessment on "omitted" or "escaped" improvements on property which has already been assessed.

Builders

Components, supra; Westward Look, supra; Whited, supra; Davidson
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v. Franklin Ave. Inv. Co.f 151 N.W. 537 (Minn. 1915) ; Woll v.
Thomas, 27 N.E. 578 (Ind. App. Ct. 1891); Williams v. Segur, 1
N.E. 707 (Ind. 1885); German Savings Bank v. Trowbridge, 100 N.E.
333 (Iowa 1904); Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 64 So. 110
(Ala. 1913); City of Georgetown v. Graves1 Administrator, 178
S.W. 1035 (Ky. 1915); Delta Land and Timber Co. v. Police Jury,
125 So. 585 (La. 1924); Langhout v. First Nat. Bank, 183 N.W. 506
(Iowa 1921).
Petitioner, in attempting to justify its propositions,
relies on specific cases in claiming retroactive assessments are
allowed where improvements on land are not considered during the
original assessment.

The cited cases are easily distinguishable

on their facts and, therefore, are not applicable to the case at
hand.

In Korash v. Mills, 263 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1972), the Supreme

Court allowed a back assessment of property taxes for property on
which a motel had been built during the previous tax year.
Plaintiffs had begun and completed construction of a motel on
their property during 1966.

In 1967, they received the same tax

assessment on the property they had received in 1966 before the
motel was constructed.

In 1968, the defendant tax assessor,

realizing the undervaluation in the prior tax year, made a
reassessment on the property for the 1967 tax year.

In allowing

the reassessment the Court found that the plaintiff was involved
in the operation of large motel properties and was familiar with
what is involved in the assessment of taxes against such properties.
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Because of this, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff
knew or should have known that the original 1967 tax assessment
did not correctly reflect the value of the new motel on the property .
In addressing situations analagous to the case at hand,
the Court reaffirmed prior holdings disallowing reassessments
after tax roles became final in a given year because of the
"inherent evils which would allow belated adjustments upward and
downward, creating instability and causing inequitable future
variances between buyers and sellers regarding tax prorations
and obligations,ff

Id, at 582 (emphasis added).

Unlike Korash the Respondent in this case did not know
that the tax assessment which occurred prior to Respondent's
purchase of the property was incorrect.

Indeed, Respondent

relied on the current tax rolls in determining that the prior
assessment had been paid in full!

Respondent's problem falls

into the problem area the Korash Court warned of regarding innocent purchasers.
As further support for its contentions, Petitioner cites
Mueller v. Mercer County, 60 N.W. 2d 768 (N.D. 1953) in which the
Supreme Court allowed reassessment of property where the original
assessment for two tax years failed to include a residence which
had been on the property a number of years prior to the
assessments in question.

The property had been in the plain-

tiff's name since before the omission of the residence in the
assessment by the County Assessor.

In fact, the plaintiff had

received assessments in the tax years prior to and after the
omission which did include the value of the residence.

The Court

held the reassessment valid, reasoning that the plaintiff was or
should have been aware that some omission by the assessor had
taken place because the assessments for the years in question
were substantially different than those prior or subsequent
thereto.
Again, unlike Mueller, Respondent in the present case
had no way of knowing if the prior assessment outlined in the tax
rolls was incorrect.

Respondent simply assumed that, since the

tax assessment for the prior year had been paid in full, there
were no delinquent taxes on the property.

Indeed, if this case

had been decided in the Mueller jurisdiction, the applicable statutes there would have precluded Petitioner from reassessing the
property since such reassessment can only occur "if the rights of
a purchaser for value without actual or constructive notice of
such error or omission shall not be prejudiced by such correction, addition, or assessment."

jto. at 682.

Petitioner further cites Chew v. Board of Assessment
Appeals, 673 P.2d 1028 (Col. App. Ct. 1983) where the Appellate
Court held that a reassessment of property was valid against an
owner who had held the property for several years both before and
after the assessment in question.
Again, unlike Chew, the Respondent here had not owned the
property for several years prior to the reassessment.

Respondent

did not know there were delinquent taxes owing on the property.
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Indeed, Respondent purchased the property only after reviewing
the tax rolls for previous years and determing that all taxes
were fully paid.
Petitioner, in conclusion, cites to Municipality of
Anchorage v. Alaska Distributors Co., 725 P.2d 692 (Alaska 1986)
wherein the Alaska Supreme Court sustained an assessment on property on which an additional warehouse had been built by the
defendant.

The defendant did not advise the assessor of the

additional warehouse, which it was obligated to do by statute.
The assessor discovered the error after a number of years and the
property was reassessed.
In distinguishing Alaska Distributors from the case at
hand, it is undisputed that the Respondent did not own the property in question at the time the undervaluation occurred.
Respondent was totally unaware that taxes were outstanding.

All

indications from the tax rolls were that the assessments against
the property were complete and the taxes were fully paid.

Further,

the Court in Alaska Distributors cited with approval an earlier
case from that jurisdiction which did not allow a reassessment
for omitted improvements on property that was purchased by a
party where, at the time of the sale, no notice of delinquent
taxes for property appeared on the tax rolls.

The Alaska Distri-

butors Court reaffirmed the prior holding that the purchaser
(new owner) is not liable for delinquent taxes because he is
entitled to rely on assessment notices which did not disclose any
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delinquency.

See Anchorage Independent School District v.

Stephens, 370 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1962).
As established above, the vast majority of Courts have
held that reassessments in subsequent tax years for "omitted
improvements" on property are not allowed.

Particularly has this

conclusion been reached in situations where a party has purchased
property, checked the tax rolls, found no delinquent taxes, and
assumed that all prior assessments are complete and that all
taxes have been paid in full.

To hold such a purchaser liable

for such reassessments is to impose a hardship upon him
impossible to bear.

Such is the case with the Respondent in this

action.
CONCLUSION
The property in question was "undervalued" by Petitioner
when it failed to include the improvements thereon.

Said improve-

ments are not "escaped" property but are "omitted" property and
are not subject to reassessment in prior tax years.

For all the

reasons set forth above, Petitioner should not be allowed to
retroactively reassess the property.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1987.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL

By Philip fc.
\l^^C^(^T^
Pugsley
Attorneys for Respondent
Sunkist Service Co.
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.«_ J 9 * 1 !. " ^ P 6 1 ^ " <<real estate/' 'Improvements," "personal property,"
•value, defined.—In this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
(1) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and
taxation according to its value, and does not include moneys, credits
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, good will, copyrights!
patents, or other things commonly known as intangibles.
(2) "Real estate" includes
(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of or right to the possession
of, land.
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on the
lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges
appertaining thereto.
(c) Improvements.
(3) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences
and improvements erected upon or aflBxed to the land, whether the title
has been acquired to the land or not.
(4) "Personal property" includes
(a) Every class of property as defined in subsection (1) hereof which
is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the
terms "real estate" and "improvements."
(b) Gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys.
(c) Bridges and ferries.
(5) "Value" and "full cash value" mean the amount at which the
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent
debtor.

59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property.—All taxable property, not specifically exempt under Article XIII, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah,
must be assessed at thirty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value. Land
and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed.

59-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor shall enter such
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or elsewhere, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the eoxmty assessor with the taxes
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title.

59-10-3. Nature and extent of lien.—Every tax upon real property is
a lien against the property assessed; and every tax due upon improvements
upon real estate assessed to others than the owner of the real estate is a
lien upon the land and improvements; which several liens attach as of the
1st day in January of each year.

